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1 Introduction and Motivation
When we speak of women or men, who and what are we talking about? When
our social advocacy and analysis engage with feminist, queer, or trans issues, we
almost immediately find ourselves making reference to women, men, and gender
in order to articulate positions and formulate key concepts. When we critique tra-
ditional sexism, we would like to be able to speak of the subordination of women,
of attitudes toward women, of disparate impact on women, of women’s shared
interests, and so on. When we advocate for the rights of transgender and queer
people, we would like to be able to understand what it is to identify as a man or a
woman (or as not a man or not a woman), to name gendered oppression, to make
sense of what it is to experience a gender transition, and so on.
But when we try to clarify the meanings of woman, man, and gender, we
find that the main desiderata for such a semantics pull in apparently conflicting
directions. On the one hand, it seems like the concepts of womanhood, manhood,
and gender have something to do with sex biology and the social norms governing
it. Without this, it’s hard to see what about genders makes them genders, and so
hard to make sense of what is distinctive about gendered oppression and about
certain aspects of transgender subjectivity. On the other hand, we want to admit at
least the conceptual possibility of gender coming apart from both sex biology and
related social norms. This seems necessary at the level of individuals if we want
to recognize the legitimacy of a full range of trans identities, and at the level of a
society if we want to recognize the conceptual coherence of radical proposals to
make membership in gender categories such as woman and man fully voluntary
and consensual.
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The rest of Section 1 sets up the problem. We begin by laying out some
desiderata that an analysis of woman and man should satisfy: descriptively, it
should link these gender categories to sex biology and social norms without re-
ducing it to either. Politically, it should allow us to make sense of the activist view
that gendering should be consensual. In section 2, we identify a feature, found in
many existing analyses of woman and man, that we will go on to suggest is prob-
lematic. Using a thought experiment in the style of Putnam’s [1973, 1975] ‘Twin
Earth’, we argue that none of them can meet all of the desiderata in section 1.
In Section 3, we propose a positive account capable of meeting all the desiderata
outlined in Section 1. According to our theory, the genders woman and man are
individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their
historical continuity with categories that were originally closely connected to sex
biology. Our conclusion summarizes different aspects of the problem we set out
to solve, and outlines directions for future research.
1.1 Genders Have To Do With Sex Biology And Social Norms
Many feminist theorists have distinguished between gender, a social category, and
sex, a biological one. Classifying people as women or men (or neither or both) is
a matter of gender, above and beyond attributing biological sex traits associated
with distinct roles in reproduction. Gender is, as the slogan goes, the ‘social
interpretation of sex’.1
This formulation emphasizes that gender is not determined by sex biology, but
it also presupposes that there is some connection between gender and sex biology.
The connection seems more or less indispensable if we want the notion of a gender
to have any special meaning at all. Human societies categorize people by all
sorts of distinctions of rank, caste, clan, title, station, and order, but most of these
distinctions are not distinctions of gender: woman and man are genders, while
noble, commoner, slave, and citizen are not. Why is this? How, for that matter,
do we recognize two categories of people in two different societies, subject to
different laws and customs, and known by different words, as both picking out the
1We are proposing a theory of social categories like woman and man. As George [2016] dis-
cusses, the term ‘gender’ is overloaded in potentially confusing ways; it is used to refer to various
more-or-less psychological notions of personal gender identity, to various aspects of gendered
behavior or gender presentation, and to systems of gender norms that connect these various com-
ponents of the gender system to each other and to sex biology. Although we will make reference
to some of these alernative meanings of ‘gender’, we aren’t trying here to offer a theory of any of
them.
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women in those societies? If we translate ‘mulieres’ in a classical Latin text using
modern English ‘women’, then we have, plausibly, translated correctly. If we
instead translate substantive uses of ‘plebeius’ with ‘woman’ (and use ‘women’
in our translations of sentences about ‘plebs’), then we have erred. What makes
us right in the first case, and wrong in the second?
Or consider another pair of examples, involving the link between the concept
of gender and the concept of transgender. Consider the case of Publius Clodius
(ne´ Claudius) Pulcher undertaking to transition, by means of adoption, from patri-
cian to plebeian status. Some might argue that this case is analogous to a gender
transition, but it seems clear that wasn’t one, and and that it is not an event that
belongs specially to transgender history. Likewise, (Sir) Patrick Stewart’s hav-
ing been made Knight Bachelor does not place him within the special scope of
transgender politics, and trans activists who opposed or were indifferent to Stew-
art’s being knighted cannot reasonably be accused of hypocrisy for failing to offer
him solidarity as a fellow trans person. Why are some social category transitions
gender transitions, while others are not?
The answer, in all these cases, seems to come back to sex biology. Not every
woman has a vulva and ovaries, or lacks a penis and testes. Not every woman
has two X chromosomes, or lacks a Y chromosome. Not every adult woman has
relatively developed breasts and the capacity to bear children, or lacks relatively
developed facial hair and the ability to sire them. But what justifies, or at least
seems in practice to motivate, the move of identifying a category of people within
a society as the women of that society (rather than as its citizens, slaves, nobles, or
commoners), is some kind of connection with some biological traits of this sort.
The same kind of connection with biology is more generally implicated in our
understanding that some social categories and not others count as genders.
1.2 Gender Is Not Merely Sex Biology Or Conformity To So-
cial Norms
We’ve argued that genders ought to have something to do with sex biology – that,
for example, what makes a category within a society the category of women in
that society ought to have some connection to biological characteristics associ-
ated with a female reproductive role. But gender is not merely sex biology, as
numerous feminist scholars have argued [Beauvoir, 1952, Rubin, 1975, Mead,
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1935, MacKinnon, 1989].2 Queer and transgender activists emphasize the impor-
tance of distinguishing gender from sex biology at an individual level: someone’s
biological traits do not determine whether they are a man, a woman, or neither.
Furthermore, an individual’s gender does not depend on their conformity to
the gender stereotypes of their time and place: a woman who wears work jeans
and fixes motorcycles is no more or less a woman than one who wears dresses and
bakes cupcakes; a man who wears eyeliner and lipsyncs to Ke$ha is no more or
less a man than one who wears Axe Body Spray and headbangs to Slayer. But if
your gender is not your sex biology, and it is not a matter of your conforming to
social norms, what is it?
Imagine three characters – call them Ada, Blaise, and Cass. All three have
46,XX karyotypes, and have genitalia, gonads, fat distribution, and so on typical
of this karyotype. All three speak in relatively deep voices, sport crew cuts, and
wear trousers and button-up shirts bought in the ‘Men’s’ section. All three are
are uninterested in men as sexual or romantic partners, but are attracted to women
(and to similar assortments of nonbinary or ambiguous people). All three have
the experience of being ‘sir’-ed by strangers about half the time, and ‘ma’am’-ed
the other half of the time. None of them has ever taken exogenous sex hormones
or had any surgical interventions intended to change their sex characteristics, and
none has any particular plans to do either of these things. All three were raised
as girls, and experienced adolescences made predictably unpleasant by a society
that considered them all girls, and brought to bear its various toxic assumptions of
compulsory femininity and compulsory androsexuality.3
Ada insists that she is a woman, and bristles when called ‘sir’ or ‘him’. Blaise
insists that he is a man and bristles when called ‘ma’am’ or ‘her’. Cass insists that
they are nonbinary. Perhaps, when pressed with ‘But which are you really?’, they
2Some feminist philosophers are skeptical about the sex/gender distinction, about the indepen-
dence of sex from gendered social norms, or about the meaningfulness of distinguishing exactly
two sex categories [Butler, 1999, Jaggar, 1983, Mikkola, 2011, Fausto-Sterling, 1993, 2000, Grosz,
1994, Prokhovnik, 2002]. But our appeal to sexes is minimal. While we are committed to the ex-
istence of sex characteristics such as hormone levels, genitals, and the 46th chromosome, nothing
we say requires sex categories to be exclusive, exhaustive, immutable, or two in number, or that
sex categories or sex characteristics be wholly independent of social interpretation. It suffices that
the biological sex characteristics be some understood family of characteristics which don’t, on
their own, furnish material for a complete account of the genders.
3The term ‘compulsory heterosexuality’, coined by Rich [1980], refers to the societal expec-
tation that all women be heterosexual – i.e., sexually oriented toward men. We use the term com-
pulsory androsexuality to discuss the expectation that someone perceived as a woman be sexually
oriented toward men, without having to assume that the person is a woman.
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Figure 1: Brantz [2017] on Consensual and Coercive Gendering
answer that they’re ‘a cactus’ with a laugh that hides more than a little frustration.
They bristle about equally at ‘sir’ and ‘ma’am’ (when pressed, they may suggest
‘elder’ and ‘comrade’ as alternatives), and are about equally uncomfortable with
feminine and masculine gendered pronouns.
We think that, barring exceptional circumstances, the facts described above
give us good reason to presume that these characters have distinct gender-category
membership: Ada is a cisgender butch lesbian, Blaise is an unremarkably mascu-
line heterosexual trans man, and Cass is a nonbinary person who is from time to
time compelled to awkwardly struggle for a succinct, socially acceptable descrip-
tion of their patterns of attraction. In the next section, we spell out the central
political principle behind these claims about Ada, Blaise, and Cass. We hope you
agree, but what matters here is that this assessment of these characters’ genders is
produced by the practices of certain sizable cultural spaces, and is a consequence
of many of our political commitments. Our main goal in this article is to show
that these commitments and practices are self-consistent.
1.3 Self-Identification and Consensual Gendering
Many queer and trans activists oppose the coercive assignment of people to gen-
der categories. They hope to create a world where gender ascription is based on
self-identification, or voluntarily opting into the category in question. Bornstein
[Bornstein, 1994], for instance, advocates an ideal that she calls ‘consensual gen-
der’ (playing off the phrase ‘consensual sex’), and contrasts it with the current
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practice, where gender categories are imposed on people without their consent.4
We’re born: a doctor assigns us a gender. It’s documented by the
state, enforced by the legal profession, sanctified by the church, and
it’s bought and sold in the media. We have no say in our gender –
we’re not allowed to question it, play with it, work it out with our
friends, lovers, or family.
Gender is not consensual. [Bornstein, 1994, 123].
By contrast, Bornstein writes, consensual gender ‘is respecting each other’s defi-
nitions of gender,’ ‘doesn’t force its way in on anyone,’ and ‘welcomes all people
as gender outcasts – whoever is willing to admit to it’ [Bornstein, 1994, 124].
(Similar ideas appear in [Serano, 2007b, 166], [Feinberg, 1998, 1], and [Bettcher,
2009] and are ubiquitous in trans activism and social justice internet culture.)
Our current methods for sorting people into gender categories are non-consensual
in several different ways. First, children are assigned a sex and a gender at or be-
fore birth, long before they are able to consent or to refuse. Second, people are
marked from infancy onward (with gendered names and pronouns, color-coded
clothing, etc.) so that others can identify their sex and gender with minimal
effort—all without regard for their privacy—and coercively pushed into one of
two gender roles, with burdensome expectations for behavior and appearance.
Finally, if, having reached an age where consent is possible, someone rejects
their original assignment, they are liable to have their gender self-ascriptions met
with denial or suspicion, or to have respect for them made contingent on stereo-
type conformity or body modification.
Under a system of self-identification, things would play out very differently.
On a weak understanding of what the ideals of consent require, children might
be presumptively assigned to gender categories at birth, but their proclamations
about their own gender would be sufficient for moving them from one category to
another. A stronger ideal is explored in the satirical children’s book X: A Fabulous
Child’s Story, where parents raise ‘Xperimental’ child, baby X, without classify-
ing it as a boy or a girl, or imposing any gendered expectations on it [Gould,
1978]. (Today, some families are raising baby Xes of their own [Green and Fried-
man, 2013].)
4The term ‘consensual gender’ is a little infelicitous, insofar as it suggests that category mem-
bership, rather than category ascription, should be consensual. It’s not clear that a person’s being
male or female is the kind of thing that admits of consent—maybe it is determined by features
of their personality beyond anyone’s conscious control. But one person’s sorting another into a
gender category can be consensual or not.
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Figure 2: Labelle [2018a,b,c] on Consensual and Coercive Gendering
Activist cartoonists Brantz [2017] and Labelle [2018a,b,c,d,e,f] provide other
depictions of this stronger ideal. Brantz (Figure 1.3) satirizes pre-natal ‘gender-
reveal parties’, where expectant parents reveal a pink or blue color-coded signal
(such as dyed cake, or a balloon inside a box) revealing whether their fetus is a
boy or a girl. Regardless of physiology, Brantz suggests, the only correct answer
is ‘however they identify’. Labelle (Figures 1.3 and 1.3) depicts a happy toddler
who has not yet expressed any affirmative gender identity being referred to as
‘they’, and engaged happily in play, largely oblivious to others’ distress at being
unable to gender them.
As trans people have by steps pushed past medical and media gatekeepers
to a measure of voice and visibility on our own terms (see Stone [2006], Ser-
ano [2007a], and Bettcher [2007]), many of us have publicly insisted that self-
identification suffices, and that our declared genders are not diminished, invali-
dated, or called into question by our appearances, our medical circumstances, or
our dispositions regarding these (see, e.g., Jones [2013], Taylor [2013], and Finch
[2013] for representative activist writings on these themes).5
The thought motivating all these authors is that imposing gender from the out-
side is wrong; individuals should have a say about which categories they belong
5That is, we have come to distinguish social transition from medical transition, to insist that
neither of these is a prerequisite for the other, and that there is no right or wrong list of life changes
required for a legitimate social transition (e.g., people should not have to change their grooming
and attire to change their pronouns or update their identity documents). See Beemyn and Rankin
[2011] and James et al. [2015] for extended discussion of how varied trans people are in their
medical and social needs.
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Figure 3: Labelle [2018d,e,f] on Consensual and Coercive Gendering (continued)
to, including gender categories like woman and man. Recognized membership
in categories like woman and man should be adjudicated based on the communi-
cated wishes of the person being gendered, not the perceptions and projections of
outsiders. A child with typical female physiology who is not assigned a gender
at birth (suppose they receive roughly the baby X upbringing), but in time comes,
of her own accord, to identify as a girl (and, later, as a woman) is still choos-
ing how she is gendered, just as much as a child of typical male physiology who
has the same upbringing arrives at the same self-identification. Neither individual
should be required to undergo any medical interventions to legitimize her category
membership.6
Before we proceed, it’s worth noting explicitly that the activist ‘party line’
is not that nonverbal infants (or people who have otherwise never communicated
a gender self-identification) have no gender, but only that their membership in
gender categories is unknown. Likewise, it does not exclude the possibility of
a person being mistaken about their gender (as many trans people feel we were
at some prior point in our lives), or even lying about their gender (as many of
us were compelled to do prior to beginning our public transitions). The view is
that communicated sincere self-identification is necessary and sufficient to justify
ascription of category membership or non-membership.7 A commitment to con-
6This is consistent with the claim that the just society should provide access to medical transi-
tion interventions, which can be tremendously important for any of a variety of reasons. It merely
says that the just society shouldn’t demand such interventions as a condition of category member-
ship.
7An earlier-circulated version of this paper was not sufficiently careful in making this distinc-
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sensual gendering is first and foremost a claim about our political responsibilities
with respect to our labeling practices, but it is in principle possible for the resulting
pattern of membership and non-membership ascriptions to be wholly accurate.
1.4 The Incoherence Objection
We, the authors, find the idea of consensual gendering politically compelling.
Some trans-antagonistic and trans-suspicious activists and philosophers, however,
have gone beyond claiming that this practice is is politically unpalatable (we of
course disagree) or that it is not the current practice (this is demonstrably true,
outside of certain pockets of queer culture), to argue that it is in principle incoher-
ent. This incoherence claim is often used to suggest that advocates of consensual
gendering must really be getting at something else, and to ascribe to us confused
or nefarious motives. We will respond to these objections by developing a the-
ory of the gender-categories woman and man that allows category ascription to
be fully consensual, and discuss how this approach can accommodate and make
sense of other kinds of genders.
At this point, readers tend to express one of two diametrically opposed ob-
jections to our project. One is from the standpoint of skeptics about consensual
gendering; the other is from the standpoint of its proponents.
If you object to consensual gendering, you be disappointed that this paper
does not defend it. Our aim is more modest: to encourage you to take the ideas
of queer and trans activists seriously, by showing that philosophers have been too
quick to dismiss them as incoherent or naı¨ve. You may or may not agree with our
desiderata for an account of gender, but, if you are tolerant of the kinds of semantic
and metaphysical tools that have been left lying around in the workshop of analytic
philosophy, we hope to convince you, at least, that a person or community could
coherently conceive of gender in a way that meets these desiderata.
If you already advocate consensual gendering, you might be appalled that we
think it needs defending. Why should trans people need the permission of aca-
demic philosophers to live as they please? As a matter of fact, we don’t think
anyone’s permission is required for trans legitimacy; neither of us waited for the
approval of the philosophical community before starting our transitions. How-
ever, we believe that philosophical foundations are valuable to queer, feminist,
and transgender activism. We also think of our theory not as a replacement for
more direct forms of activism, but as a supplement to them. These foundations
tion, as [Barnes, forthcoming, fn 22] points out.
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can help us combat arguments that have too often been used to undermine the
legitimacy of trans people’s lives and identities. So, whatever your views on con-
sensual gendering, we hope you will hear us out.
Consider Reilly-Cooper [2015], who argues that consensual gendering imme-
diately collapses into incoherence.
If we take an individual’s self-declared gender identity as the sole
necessary and sufficient condition for membership in a gender class,
the result is that the meaning of the word “woman” is reduced to
a subjective mental state, to a feeling in a person’s head. . . . If the
word woman is defined as “someone who thinks they are a woman”,
then the word woman becomes meaningless, and can no longer be the
name of anything. The political implication of that is that women as
a class disappear.
(emphasis Reilly-Cooper’s)
A common further inference from these incoherence claims is that individual
trans people’s self-identifications must reflect beliefs about which of their behav-
iors or dispositions are incompatible with their assigned genders. On this view,
it would be incoherent for Cass to understand the similarities between themself,
Blaise, and Ada, and nevertheless assert that they are neither a woman nor a man,
while Ada is the former and Blaise is the latter. We are told that Cass must re-
ally purport to possess some personality trait that is in principle incompatible with
womanhood. This would deny Ada either that personality trait or her status as a
woman in good standing, both of which would be appalling, and if Cass’s identi-
fying as nonbinary in fact necessitated all of this, it would be a serious criticism of
Cass. Versions of this claim are found in popular articles [Reilly-Cooper, 2016],
[Jensen, 2015], and [Stock, 2018], and in at least one semi-recent academic article
[McKitrick, 2007].
These authors typically refuse to consider more than three options: gender
is a biological reproductive category; gender category membership is a matter of
conforming to stereotypes; or gender category membership is some kind of private
mental state – where they take this third option to be incoherent or otherwise
unacceptable. Allen [2018] lays out the options as follows, in a blog post on
Medium.
But, once one divorces gender from biological sex like this, it is very
difficult to see what the gender categories man and woman are. Either
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being a woman is associated with gender roles, social roles and be-
haviour which women typically perform, or it is based on something
internal to a person, the feeling of being a woman, perhaps.
Allen argues that feelings about womanhood are legitimate only if they have an
identifiable biological basis since
‘woman’ has no meaning if it can mean different things to different
individuals in virtue of private, subjective feelings when no-one has a
way to ascertain whether the feelings reported by different people are
of the same type.
and concludes that
We either need to bring biology back into the picture. . . or we need to
be done with gender entirely and say that ‘woman’ picks out neither
a natural nor a socially constructed kind.
[Reilly-Cooper, 2016] offers an even narrower range of options.
Gender is the value system that ties desirable (and sometimes undesir-
able?) behaviours and characteristics to reproductive function. Once
we’ve decoupled those behaviours and characteristics from reproduc-
tive function – which we should – and once we’ve rejected the idea
that there are just two types of personality and that one is superior to
the other – which we should – what can it possibly mean to continue
to call this stuff ‘gender’?
These arguments are not, alas, idle exercises in philosophical skepticism with
no connection to public debate. Opposition to consensual gendering is a recurring
feature of transphobic and trans-exclusionary advocacy and harassment. Trans-
exclusionary feminists have opposed reforms to laws like the UK’s 2004 Gender
Recognition Act [Hinsliff, 2018] and New Zealand’s Births, Deaths, Marriages
and Relationships Registration Bill [Small] that would make it simpler for trans
people to change the gender markers on their legal IDs. In the US, a 2017 memo
from the Department of Health and Human Services proposes to block trans peo-
ple from legal gender recognition altogether, suggesting that “The sex listed on a
person’s birth certificate, as originally issued, shall constitute definitive proof of
a person’s sex unless rebutted by reliable genetic evidence” on the grounds that
(only) such a definition is “is clear, grounded in science, objective and adminis-
trable” [Green et al., 2018].
11
The costs are cultural as well as narrowly legal. Arguments against consen-
sual gendering are intimately connected with accusations that trans women (or on
those perceived to be trans woman) have a reductive view of womanhood, with
efforts to paint trans men as confused tomboys or self-hating lesbians, with dis-
missals of nonbinary folks as ‘special snowflakes’, and with numerous other lines
of attack. We can attest that we have, in both activist and philosophical spaces, had
the experience of people ignoring our testimony as trans people and explaining to
us what our gender identifications must really mean. Thus, the allegation of inco-
herence underlies the use of a kind of interpretive charity as a tool of testimonial
injustice and collective defamation.
We will show that this incoherence-based dismissal is not warranted, by de-
veloping an account that allows for the possibility of gendering everyone by self-
identification.8 In part 2, we will point to to features of popular theories of woman
and man that, we argue, make them ill-suited to accommodate the possibility of
consensual gendering. In part 3, we develop a positive theory of woman and man
which shares the advantages of previously developed theories, but allows for the
possibility of fully consensual gendering for everyone.
2 Defining Genders
Many contemporary theories of the categories woman and man share two key
features.
First, they are material: their criteria of womanhood and manhood make refer-
ence only to facts about sex biology, outward appearance, behavioral dispositions,
social norms, experience of privilege and subordination and the like. That is, they
refer exclusively to the material circumstances of biology, behavior, and power
relations within the society.
Second, they are ahistorical: they entail that who counts as a man or a woman
at a given time is determined by facts about sex, social norms, power relations
etc. at that time.9 In metaphysics jargon, gender properties in a community C
at a time t strongly globally supervene on the state of C at t, together with the
8We are claiming only that this is a metaphysical and semantic possibility. We leave open the
possibility that nontrivial fully consensual gendering might lead to an intrinsically unstable social
configuration. It might be that adopting fully consensual gendering would lead to the end of the
gender categories through lack of interest, but we don’t take this question to bear directly on the
question of coherence.
9Here times may be short spans, rather than instants.
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individual’s biological traits and position within C at t: whenever two worlds have
the same overall pattern of sex, social norms, etc. at a time, they also have the
same distribution of genders at that time [see McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014,
4.2.3].
Materiality and ahistoricality seem like appealing features for any analysis of
gender. They pin gender classification to a manageable set of relevant ingredients
– sex, social norms, and power. They are shared, trivially, by naı¨ve biological
accounts of gender, such as those that equate manhood and womanhood with par-
ticular genomic properties or a particular genital configuration. They are also
shared (or approximately shared) by many leading definitions of woman and man
in the feminist literature.
Haslanger [2012] defends one prominent pair of material, ahistorical defini-
tions.
(SH) S is a woman iffdf S is systematically subordinated along some dimen-
sion (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target
for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to
be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.
S is a man iffdf S is systematically privileged along some dimension
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target
for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to
be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction [Haslanger, 2012,
230].
Other material, ahistorical accounts are given by Hale [1996], Daly [207] and
Stoljar [1995], who characterize womanhood in terms of sufficiently approximat-
ing clusters of anatomical and social characteristics, and by Saul [2012], who
claims that attributions of womanhood or manhood are correct just in case the
object of the attribution is relevantly similar to most of those possessing certain
biological markers (where standards of relevant similarity are contextually deter-
mined). These theories are not essentially ahistorical, since one could include
historical features in either the cluster of relevant properties or the contextually
supplied standards of similarity, but discussion in these papers is focused almost
exclusively on material, ahistorical membership criteria.10
10The one exception to this rule is appeal to self-identification in Hale and Saul, which we do
not have the space to treat in detail. We will note that self-identification raises a circularity worry:
if being a woman is defined in part by a person’s tendency to identify as a woman, something
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Although ahistorical, material accounts are both common and intuitively ap-
pealing, we will argue that they are too limited, and should be replaced with a
historical account.
2.1 Twin Planets
We want to put some pressure on accounts that seek to give a complete semantics
of a kind term in terms of some constrained set of facts (the material facts) in
the here-and-now, without any regard for the history associated with those kind
terms and the corresponding kind-concepts. Put this way, our project bears an ob-
vious resemblance to externalist, anti-descriptivist, causal-history-dependent ac-
counts of kind terms and proper names, so it should be unsurprising that our main
thought experiment borrows certain aspects of its science-fiction setup from Hi-
lary Putnam’s [1973, 1975] ‘Twin Earth’ thought experiments.
Imagine two (more or less monocultural) worlds. The first, Patriarcha, is like
many contemporary Earth societies: nominally liberal and egalitarian, but with
persistent social roles that systematically disadvantage some people relative to
others based on their physical characteristics. Patriarchal society is divided into
blokes, a privileged group of people assumed to possess typically male biological
traits, and sheilas, a subordinated group of people assumed to possess typically
female biological traits. Children are typically classified as blokes or sheilas at or
before birth, usually based on inspection of their genitals. Blokes are stereotyped
as strong and aggressive; sheilas are stereotyped as weak, nurturing, and deco-
rative. (The sociobiologists of Patriarcha design elaborate justifications for these
stereotypes, which we need not rehash here.) It seems intuitively correct to say
that the blokes on Patriarcha are men, while the sheilas are women, and definitions
like (SH) bear this out.
The second world, Amazonia, is a mirror image Patriarcha. It too is nomi-
nally liberal and egalitarian, but with two persistent social roles (assigned at or
before birth based on genitals) that favor some people and disadvantage others.
Amazonian society is divided into grrrls, a privileged group of people assumed to
possess typically female biological traits, and bois, a subordinated group of peo-
ple assumed to possess typically male biological traits. Grrrls are stereotyped as
strong and aggressive; Amazonian sociobiologists argue that this is a hard-wired
further needs to be said about the object of this identification. Our proposal in Section 3.3 resolves
this type of circularity by separating out the category woman as a persistent social entity and object
of identification from the criteria for being a woman.
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consequence of the innate drive to defend one’s young. Bois, meanwhile, are
stereotyped as weak, nurturing, and decorative; Amazonian sociobiologists con-
jecture that bois, who evolved to compete for female attention, are naturally suited
to be decorative, invest in the hard work of housecleaning and childcare, and cater
to grrrls’ needs.
According to our intuition about the ordinary use of the terms ‘woman’ and
‘man’, grrrls are women and bois are men. Haslanger’s definitions (SH) entail
that Amazonia contains no women and no men, since grrrls are not systematically
subordinated and bois are not systematically advantaged. Haslanger’s account
could be modified to give verdicts that agree with our intuition [see Mikkola,
2009], but whether we so modify it is beside the point; on any reasonable theory,
bois are not women, and grrrls are not men.
Now imagine that Patriarcha and Amazonia become more progressive about
gender, but only in a very limited way. Rather than abolishing gendered asso-
ciations altogether, both worlds liberalize the criteria for membership in their
(previously) female-associated and male-associated categories. People born with
typically male biological traits are allowed to transition to the sheila and grrrl
categories; people born with typically female biological traits are allowed to tran-
sition to the bloke and boi categories. Eventually, assignment of roles at birth is
abandoned, and children are identified simply as kids until they affirmatively ex-
press an identity as grrrls or bois (in the Amazonian case) or blokes or sheilas (in
the Patriarchal case). We will assume that most kids, perhaps all, eventually pick
one recognized role or the other.
Through all these changes, the roles themselves remain largely intact, but the
demographics of the two worlds shift until there is no correlation at all between
gender role and biological sex characteristics. The bloke and grrrl categories may
be composed disproportionately (though not exclusively) of rough-and-tumble
types who are relatively well-equipped to satisfy their norms, but roughly half
of all blokes and half of all grrrls possess typically female biology. (Similarly for
sheilas and bois, with appropriate substitutions.) Patriarchs and Amazons con-
tinue to treat gender categories as important (and, problematically, they still use
them as a basis for differential treatment), but they come to accept that there is no
necessary connection between biology and gender.11
The demographic shifts on Patriarcha and Amazonia uncouple grrrl, boi, bloke,
11For simplicity, we ignore the issue of medical transition. We can stipulate that both Patriarchal
and Amazonian society place difficult-to-justify constraints on bodily self-determination which
prevent anyone from medically transitioning.
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and sheila from their biological associations without destroying them as cate-
gories. Membership in these categories has come to more closely resemble a
consensual gendering arrangement, although unjust discriminatory norms for the
categories persist. Since blokes are men and sheilas are women before the de-
mographic shift, it seems that blokes are men and sheilas are women after the
demographic shift too. Furthermore, since grrrls are not men (and plausibly are
women) and bois are not women (and plausibly are men) before the demographic
shift, it seems that grrrls are still not men (and plausibly are women) and bois are
still not women (and plausibly are men) after the demographic shift.
While the preservation of the manhood of blokes, the non-manhood of grrrls,
and so on across this shift is not logically necessitated by what we’ve said so
far about Patriarcha and Amazonia, we take this picture to fit best with our un-
derstanding of the legitimacy of trans identities and the conceptual possibility of
determining gender by self-identification, rather than biology. If future circum-
stances conspire so that trans people outnumber cis people, while people who
are neither men nor women remain a relatively small minority, then the (cis or
trans) men of that future will still be men, and the (cis or trans) women will still
be women – saying otherwise seems to treat trans identities as probationary or
second-rate.12 Since it seems that ‘bloke’ and ‘sheila’ just are the words in Patri-
archal English that pick out men and women, the preceding considerations ought
to apply equally to blokes and sheilas, and, once this is granted, the formal sym-
metries involve make it hard to avoid treating grrrls and bois analogously.
But now we come to a problem: after the demographic shift, the grrrl and
bloke categories are indistinguishable in ahistorical, material terms. On the input
side, there is no longer any significant difference between the characteristics that
result in someone’s being classified as a grrrl on Amazonia and the characteristics
that result in their being classified as a bloke on Patriarcha. Membership in both
categories is determined by self-identification. And on the output side, the same
social norms govern grrrls and blokes, and both groups represent the same diver-
sity of sex characteristics. (Likewise for bois and sheilas). So by any material,
ahistorical account, Patriarchal blokes are men if and only if Amazonian grrrls are
men. Our position that blokes are men and grrrls aren’t (and are probably women
besides), is thus incompatible with any account of this type.
Our thought experiment is fanciful, but it makes a serious point. On the one
12Bettcher [2013, 241] articulates a positive version of the requirement that trans women’s
should gender status not be treated as second-rate. She writes that ‘“trans woman” applies un-
problematically and without qualification to all self-identified trans women’, and ‘being a trans
woman is a sufficient condition for being a woman’ (emphasis Bettcher’s).
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hand, a commitment to the possibility of consensual gendering and the full au-
thenticity of trans identities seems to require that gender categories can survive
changes in membership criteria and demographic makeup that sever gender from
sex. On the other hand, a theoretical commitment to a ahistorical, material ap-
proach, together with the details of the Patriarcha and Amazonia examples, seems
to entail that gender categories will not reliably survive changes of this kind.
Something has to give.
3 Sketch of a Theory of Genders
Below, we try to resolve the tension between the goal of individual level indepen-
dence of sex and gender, and and the need for gender categories to be in some
way rooted in sex distinctions. Our account will appeal to a historical theory of
gender to explain how even after the demographic shifts on Amazonia and Pa-
triarcha, the blokes of Patriarcha can remain men, while the grrrls of Amazonia
remain non-men.
We begin with a review of some themes from Bach [2012], who, like us, holds
that genders have historical essences. After sketching Bach’s theory and high-
lighting some of its problems, we’ll discuss our alternative (but related) approach.
3.1 Bach’s Theory
For Bach, to be a woman or a man is to be a member of a historical lineage. To
explain what this means, he draws on the analogy of Nissan Sentra transmission.
“A hunk of steel comes to belong to the historical kind Sentra Transmission if
it is a reproduction of a lineage of Sentra Transmissions – if it is sculpted and
pounded according to a historically specified Nissan design plan [Bach, 2012,
259].” Similarly, a human counts as a woman if that human is a copy of other
women. A person need not conform to any given gender stereotype in order to
count as a woman; rather
If a particular female has undergone the ontogenetic process through
which one exemplifies a participatory relation to a lineage of women,
then even if she fails to exemplify any of the properties of women’s
historical gender role, she is still a woman because she has the right
history [Bach, 2012, 261]
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Bach’s theory is historical at the individual level; he holds that to be a woman
or a man is to arise from the right type of historical lineage [Bach, 2012, 246].
It is also historical at a more abstract level. Among the components of a gender
system that Bach proposes to analyze historically are binary sex categories; gender
stereotypes; gender identities; gender socialization; social and legal institutions;
artifacts like dolls, dresses, toy soldiers; and binary gender roles [Bach, 2012,
247-248].
All of these things count as gendered, according to Bach, because they are
reproductions of earlier elements in a certain type of historical lineage. One might
wonder what exactly this reproduction consists in. What makes an individual
woman a copy of her mother, female peers, or female authority figures (so that
she counts as a woman) but not a copy of her father, male peers, or male authority
figures (so that she does not also count as a man)? We can understand what it is
for one skirt or toy truck to be copied from another, but what is it for one binary
sex category or gender identity to be copied from another?
Bach’s discussion of reproduction emphasizes two points. First, he claims that
items in the social ontology (including categories, stereotypes, identities, etc.)
count as gendered insofar as they help support a self-sustaining gender system.
Second, he claims that individuals get their genders by being either genetically
constituted or socially conditioned in a way that gives them the function of con-
forming to gender roles. (To have the function of conforming to a gender role isn’t
to conform to it, but to be such that the internal standards of the gender system
say that you should.)
We represent Bach’s theory by the drawing in Figure 1. The concept woman
at a given time applies to all the people who are women at that time. Those people
get to be women by being copies of the previous generation’s women (presumably
through a process of identity formation based on the previous generation’s woman
category). These categories count as woman categories because they play the
appropriate role in preserving a self-sustaining gender system.
By treating genders as lineages, Bach is able to accommodate a great deal of
gender diversity: there is no physical or psychological property that individual
women must share with each other. But Bach’s account still tells us something
about what it is to be a gender and how genders relate to sex biology: in order to
count as a stable gender system, a system must be connected to binary sex roles.
Bach’s approach has a number of limitations that make it unsuitable for our
purposes. First consider Amazonia and Patriarcha: once the sheila category is
detached from sex biology, what makes sheilas women (or, indeed, makes sheila
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Figure 4: Bach’s theory of lineages.
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of Ada, Blaise, and Cass. What makes it the case that Ada springs from the
woman lineage (and not the man lineage), while Blaise springs from the man lin-
eage (and not the woman lineage), and Cass springs from neither? Bach’s explicit
discussion of trans politics suggests that trans people become men or women by
making themselves into copies of men or women, or in Bach’s terminology “initi-
ating those ontogenetic processes that transform individuals into reproductions of
whichever gender lineage they were not originally assigned [Bach, 2012, 269].”
For him, people in the midst of a gender transition are borderline cases of men and
women. So while his theory allows for individuals to have some control over their
gender category membership, it can’t simultaneously do justice to Ada, Blaise,
and Cass, all of whom this kind of account will have to assign to the same gen-
der. Worse, it’s hard to see how, on Bach’s account, gender category membership
can be granted without sufficiently good copying of stereotypically male or fe-
male traits. If we want butch women – including butch trans women – to count as
women, Bach’s account will not do the job.
One further difficulty is worth noting: Bach doesn’t offer an account of non-
binary gender identities. His comments on intermediate status suggest a way for
people to be neither men nor women, but it’s hard to see how this can make sense
of the diversity of nonbinary identities, including culturally persistent “third gen-
ders”. Bach’s theory seems to reduce nonbinary status to non-conformity to one’s
assigned gender norms, erasing the nuances of nonbinary experience and endors-
ing exactly the picture that drives the political attack on nonbinary identity in
[Reilly-Cooper, 2016].
Below, we outline our own theory, which is similar to Bach’s, but does a much
better job accounting for the possibility of consensual gendering.
3.2 Our Historical Theory of Woman and Man
Our proposal begins with ahistorical, material gender concepts that link gender to
sex, but adds historical modifications that allow for the legitimacy of gendering
based on self-identification. To begin, we say that:
A Primordial F (M) Category is a material, ahistorical recognized category within
a society for which membership is adjudicated by members of the society
based primarily on biological traits understood as directly or indirectly as-
sociated with a specifically female (male) reproductive role, or on being
perceived (perhaps inaccurately) to have any of these characteristics.
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The woman and man concepts of (SH) are plausibly characterized as picking
out primordial F and M categories, respectively.13. At the earliest stage of our
story above, grrrl and sheila were plausibly primordial F categories, and boi and
bloke were plausibly primordial M categories.
Unlike Bach’s theory, our theory is not historical at the level of individuals.
We do not claim that to be a woman is to belong to a certain lineage. Rather, our
theory is historical at the level of categories, which are not just arbitrary sets of
individuals (or set-intensions), but social objects recognized by the community.
In order for something to count as an F (M) category, the community must have
the expressive resources to pick out the category, and moreover must ascribe it
meaning as a social institution.
We hold that gender categories can persist through change, just as individuals
do. Instead of talking in terms of reproduction, therefore, we talk in terms of
persistence. And unless it undergoes a drastic change, an F(M) category that
persists will remain an F(M) category. Thus, we can say that:
A Historical F (M) Category is a category descended (perhaps trivially)14 from
a Primordial F (M) category by the right sort of causal continuity.
Like the christenings sometimes supposed to lie at the beginnings of the causal
chains in a causal theory of names [see Kripke, 1980], the primordial classes are
something of an idealization. A more mature version of this account would, no
doubt, recognize them as part of the ‘clean’ version of the story that serves to
motivate the concept, but that may in many actual societies be more a matter of
mythology than of history. The genesis and maintenance of these types of classes
in the real world is poorly understood, but is presumably complex in ways that
are at odds with hypothesizing an era of perfectly ahistorical primordial gender
classes. On an intuitive level, we want to say that some classes that do not liter-
ally conform to this mythology have a history that is, for all interesting cultural
purposes, closely enough approximated by it to allow them to count as historical
F (M) classes. The exact implementation of this is left as a problem for the future.
We also leave open the general question of what constitutes the right sort of
causal continuity (just as Bach has left open the question of what counts as re-
producing a lineage), but we can point to particular cases where the right sort of
13We can reasonably say that (SH) makes category membership primarily a matter of biological
traits, even though it also depends partly on domination and subordination.
14We take being the category G at time t to be the trivial case of being descended from G as it
existed at t.
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causal continuity is present. Here on Earth, gender categories are handed off from
one generation to the next by a variety of social and institutional practices, in-
cluding gender markers on legal documents, gendered personal names, gendered
clothing and other gendered artifacts, and informal social norms that govern the
conduct of male and female people. (See Bach’s paper for an extended discussion
of some of these mechanisms.) Similarly, we assume that on Patriarcha and Ama-
zonia, the categories bloke, sheila, grrrl and boi have the right sort of continuity
across the demographic shift.
In any contemporary anglophone society, woman and man pick out important
F and M categories. In order to make sense of the inclination to speak of Ama-
zonian grrrls or Patriarchal sheilas as women, we would like to have a notion of
when it is appropriate to identify an F (M) category in one society as the cor-
rect ‘translation’ of an F (M) category in another society. Unfortunately, we are
not at present equipped to offer a full theory of correspondence of gender cate-
gories across societies, so we will limit ourselves to a first attempt at the problem
of women and men. We propose that the English terms woman and man (and
presumably the corresponding words in other languages) do not refer to specific
categories, but express properties held by categories that occupy a certain social
historical positions in their societies. The definition below provides that attempt:
it covers the simple case where a society has a unique F (M) category, and is silent
otherwise.
The Category of Women15(preliminary definition) in a society/community C
is the unique historical F category in C, if C has a unique historical F cate-
gory.
The Category of Men (preliminary definition) in a society/community C is the
unique historical M category in C, if C has a unique historical M category.
Nothing in our account of historical F (M) categories requires that a society
have only one F category and only one M category. If a society ends up with
more than one historical F category, how are we to decide which one (if any) to
identify as the category of women? Sometimes, there will be a ‘main’ F category
that wins out, where we can develop the notion of a ‘main’ F category in one of
several ways; for example:
15If we think, following Haslanger, that subordination is essential to womanhood, and domi-
nance or privilege essential to manhood, this would be one plausible point at which to build in
these requirements.
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The Category of Women (salience definition) in a society/community C is the
most salient historical F category in C, if C has a unique such F category.
The Category of Women (generality definition) in a society/community C is the
most general historical F category in C, of which all others are conceived of
as (at least approximately) special cases, if C has a unique such F category.
The Category of Women (cardinality definition) in a society/community C is
the historical F category in C that under non-anomalous circumstances has
the most numerous generally recognized members, if C has a unique such F
category.
(Analogous extensions are possible for the category of men.)
When there is not even a clear ‘main’ historical F category, things get harder.
In a society with two (more-or-less) disjoint historical F categories of roughly
equal status, how should we make sense of the notion of woman? One option
is to say that the membership of woman is indeterminate; another is to identify
woman as the union/disjunction of all of a society’s historical F categories; and
yet another is to say that woman is inapplicable in such a society—that there truly
are no women. Since such scenarios are not our focus here, we leave all these
options on the table, and move on.
The structure of our account is shown in figure 2. At the left is a primordial F
(M) category, which gains its status as an F category by being anchored to biologi-
cal sex characteristics. As time passes, historical F categories (depicted at the cen-
ter and right) evolve from the primordial category. Gender categories are handed
down from one generation to the next using a variety of social institutions – prac-
tices of printing gender markers on legal document, social expectations linked to
gender, and so forth. The F categories continue to count as F categories because
there is a path of historical continuity linking each category to its progenitor and
leading back to a primordial F category, which is in turn anchored to biological sex
characteristics. If there are no other F categories, then each F category pictured is
the category of women at the time when it exists.
Our theory delivers the right verdicts in the case of Amazonia and Patriarcha.
Before the demographic shift, sheila and grrrl are the only primordial F cate-
gories in their respective societies, while bloke and boi are the only primordial
M categories. Therefore, sheilas and grrrls are women, while blokes and bois are
men.
Since most characteristics of the genders on Patriarcha and Amazonia are rel-





















































Figure 5: Our theory of women and men.
24
historical F categories, while bloke and boi remain historical M categories. No
other categories are introduced, so (we may reasonably assume) each society has
only one historical M category and one historical F category; thus, even by our
preliminary definitions of woman and man, sheilas and grrrls are still women,
while blokes and bois are still men.
Returning to the motivations of section 1, we can see that our characterization
accounts for the link between gender and sex biology by ensuring that at some
point in history, biological sex characteristics must play an important role in the
society’s criteria for gender category membership. Yet it allows for the possibility
of consensual gendering at a societal level.
So far, we have advanced a theory of what it is for a category to be a gender,
and of what it is for a gender to be a category of women or a category of men, but
we have said nothing about which people are women (or men, or nonbinary. . . ).16
Barnes [forthcoming] argues that a theory of gender categories is not and need not
be a theory of category membership. While this is true, we aim to show that it’s
coherent to claim Ada is a woman, Blaise is a man, and Cass is neither. For this,
we need some theory of category membership Section 3.3 surveys several options,
each compatible with our theory of gender categories, which yield this judgment.
Our aim is not to adjudicate among these theories, but to provide a sense of what’s
possible.
3.3 Belonging to Gender Categories
Societies generally have some practices for adjudicating membership in the cate-
gories they recognize, so let’s begin with that:
X is Gendered as a G in community C (where G is any gender category of C)
iff C’s practices of adjudicating category membership would place X in the
G category.
X is Gendered as a woman (man) in community C iff there is a category G in
C such that X is gendered as a G and G is the category of women (men) in
C.
Haslanger’s theory equates being a woman (man, G) with being gendered as a
woman (man, G). This has worrying consequences, as philosophers like Saul
16This is analogous to the situation of having a theory what sort of social entity the United
States or Harvard University is, but not of what is involved in an individual being a US national or
a Harvard student.
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[2012] and Diaz-Leon [2016] point out. It may turn out that Ada is not a woman,
if the heteronormative society around her refuses to recognize her womanhood.
Blaise may count as a woman and not a man, if people around him coercively
gender him as a woman. Cass may end up counting as a woman, a man, or both,
when the people around them gender them without their consent.
One response to this problem, proposed by Dembroff [2017], is to accept that
these unfortunate verdicts are true the actual world, but to point out that things
don’t have to be this way. Insofar it is true that Ada is not a woman, Cass is a
woman, or Blaise is not a man, these are oppressive truths, which we can and
should alter by changing our gendering practices. Even if category membership
isn’t actually decided by self-identification, it could be.
Another option is to change our account of the relationship between gendering
and category membership. For instance, Saul [2012] suggests that ascribing a
gender G to someone (e.g., calling them a woman or a man) is true iff the person
is relevantly similar to those who are habitually gendered as Gs. Saul’s theory
can be combined with an ideal of consensual gendering, since there might be a
norm requiring that we treat self-identification as relevant in most or all contexts.
Another version of this strategy, proposed by Diaz-Leon [2016], has it that the
extensions of woman and man are partly normative—i.e., a matter of which moral
and political standards govern our context. It’s easy to see how this theory might
fit with a norm of consensual gendering—the norms governing gendering might
require that classification be consensual.
Both strategies – accepting that there are oppressive truths about gender, but
that these truths can be changed, and claiming that people’s membership in gen-
der categories depends partly on facts about how they ought to be gendered –
explain how consensual gendering is a coherent possibility. Having made room
for consensual gendering in the Twin Earth case, and in the case of Ada, Blaise
and Cass, we now turn to consider how we might generalize our account of the
genders woman and man to a more comprehensive theory of gender categories.
3.4 Other Genders
So far, we have limited our analysis to F and M categories, and the connected
concepts of femaleness (or womanhood) and maleness (or manhood). These op-
tions do not exhaust the diversity of attested genders; there are also categories like
burrnesha, genderfluid person, demigirl, and demiguy – some with relatively long
traditions; others which have achieved recognition only recently. Within a single
community, the available gender categories need not be exclusive or exhaustive,
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and may stand in interesting relations of containment or partial overlap. For ex-
ample, some genderfluid people might also be men, others women, and still others
neither or both.
What other genders might there be alongside woman and man, and how might
they come into existence? A good account ought to have room for additional
genders, and ought to make sense of how it is that they are genders at all.
One way to be a gender category is to have membership adjudicated based on
certain features of reproductive biology, (like our primordial F and M categories),
or to be historically descended from such a category (like our historical F and M
categories). We suspect that there are metaphysically possible scenarios where
sexes other than male and female give rise to primordial gender categories, but
not just any feature of reproductive biology will do; prepubescent child and post-
menopausal woman do not count as genders despite being adjudicated based on
reproductive features.
We propose that, in general, primordial gender categories must be adjudicated
based on cultural conventions that putatively divide of the population into sexes,
where the famously fraught traditional sorts female and male are representative
examples of sexes. If some intersex conditions (or families of such conditions)
are likewise understood as sexes in a given society, then that society might asso-
ciate them with distinct primordial gender categories. (See Fausto-Sterling [1993]
for an argument that this is possible.) Sexes might likewise be grounded in bi-
ological traits that result from deliberate human intervention, in which case it is
possible to have primordial gender categories characterized in terms of surgical or
pharmacological modifications of one’s sex characteristics. (See Ayala and Vasi-
lyeva [2015] for a sketch of how this might work, with fluid and mutable category
membership.)
In speaking of sexes, we don’t mean to commit ourselves to biological essen-
tialism. What counts as a sex is arguably determined in part by social factors,
as is the determination of membership in culturally available sexes. A complete
version of the sketch we provide here would include a theory of which putatively
biological categories count as sexes within a given society.17
17For instance, perhaps sexes ought to be specifiable in terms of reproductive capacities, or in
terms of biological traits associated with reproductive capacities. We might claim that in order to
count as a system of sexes, a system of categories must separate fertile individuals with paradigm
female biological traits from fertile individuals with paradigm male biological traits; or have some
particular kind of social salience; or be thought of as a partition of the population, in that the
normal order of affairs is thought to involve every individual belonging to exactly one of the cate-
gories, with exceptions regarded as rare and fundamentally aberrant. These are a few possibilities
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Beginning with sexes is a start. But gender categories need not be derived from
sexes by any direct historical chain. Consider, for example, the category gender-
fluid, popularized under this name in relatively recent history, which is character-
ized (very roughly) by personal affinity for or identification with different genders
that varies over time. The genderfluid identity is not plausibly analyzed, or even
idealized, as being rooted in any primordial gender category. Instead, what makes
it a gender is the way that it is understood within a system of existing gender cate-
gories. If somebody sometimes conceives of and presents themselves as a woman,
or like a woman, and other times conceives of and presents themselves as a man,
or like a man, this makes them an exemplar of (one sort of) genderfluidity, and
one reason for accepting genderfluid as a gender status is that woman and man
are (historical) gender categories. Something similar could be said about gen-
der classifications like demigirl, demiguy, bigender, and perhaps some traditional
third-gender categories.
So something can be a gender by fitting into a system of things that already
count as genders. This idea helps us make sense of the way some people, espe-
cially in online subcultural spaces, use random organisms or inanimate objects as
gender labels. Consider, for example, the way Dillon [2007] characterizes them-
self as having the gender cactus.
A while back I complained about wanting to replace my gender with a
set of outward-facing spikes. . . actually cactus works way better than
male or female as a gender for me. It’s a little tongue in cheek, but I
mean, look at this. Cacti:
• care more about sunlight and water and safety than appearances,
but still blossom in (bright pink, for many species) flowers when they
feel like it
• are covered in spines to protect them from being consumed, but
need the touch of the animals that know how to interact with them
safely
• won’t hurt you if you don’t hurt them!
. . .
among many, and we will not evaluate them here.
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What seems to be going on here is that ‘I’m a cactus’ is, in some (metaphor-
ical, humorous) sense, is the best reply that the Dillon can offer for the question
‘Are you a man or a woman?’, and perhaps for the question ‘What is your gen-
der?’ Taken as a, gender cactus has this ‘best reply’ characteristic in common
with (explanatory expansions of) genderfluid, demigirl, and the like. It might lean
more heavily on metaphor and humor than the latter two, but this only shows that
metaphor and humor are important communicative resources, especially when we
find ourselves near the limits of established vocabulary, or discussing emotionally
charged topics. Given that we are only aware of one case of somebody claiming
the gender label cactus, and that a highly qualified one, we do not want to en-
dorse the view that cactus is a gender. But if we want to accept more established
non-binary genders as genuine, it does not seem to us implausible or absurd that
cactus could be a gender, if it obtained some minimal level of social stability and
subcultural recognition.
Once genderfluid or cactus comes into existence as a gender, it seems capable
of surviving as a gender by the same type of historical process as woman and
man, even if it evolves to no longer be even roughly definable in terms of concepts
like woman and man (perhaps by outliving those two categories). The following
recursive definition captures our discussion of ways for gender categories into
existence, and gathers it into a first-pass definition of gender:
(Primordial Case) If G is is an ahistorical category within a society for which
membership is adjudicated by members of the society based primarily on
biological traits understood as directly or indirectly associated with a per-
son’s sex in that society, or on being perceived (perhaps inaccurately) to
have any of these characteristics, then G is a gender.
(Historical Case) If G is a category (which may reasonably be idealized as being)
descended (perhaps trivially) from a previously established gender by the
right sort of causal continuity, then G is a gender.
(Symbiotic Case) If G is a category defined primarily in terms of previously es-
tablished genders, situated as an alternative to previously established gen-
ders, or understood as a potentially indispensable clarification or qualifica-
tion of some previously established gender or genders, then G is a gender.
(Minimal Closure Clause) Nothing is a gender of any society/community except
as provided for above.
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This seems to us to provide for the full range of genders that we are aware of,
but still requires that every gender ultimately be linked to a system of primordial
sex-biology-based genders, and excludes other sorts of social categories from be-
ing genders. This remains only an initial attempt, and each case requires further
clarification and refinement. We also don’t wish to seriously endorse the mini-
mal closure clause, as we may have left out some important ways for things to
be genders. The ‘nothing else’ provision should be taken as part of a preliminary
exercise, and not as a political exclusion of other putative genders as invalid or
second-rate. Still, we think the general approach shows promise: something gets
to be a gender by being a classification of people based on sex biology, or by
connecting back to such a sex-based category by some (finite) number of steps of
dependency. The admissible kinds of dependency include, at least, being histor-
ically derived in a suitable way from something already established as a gender,
and being a suitable kind of reply to the ‘What is your gender?’ question, but
there may be others that we have not considered.
4 Conclusion
We began by identifying desiderata for a metaphysics and semantics of gender
suitable for queer and feminist theory and activism: such a theory ought to ac-
commodate the conceptual possibility of fully consensual membership in gender
categories (so that people might be gendered based entirely on self-identification)
while still enabling us to make sense of gender as a distinct social phenomenon
connected with sex. We then argued that material, ahistorical theories cannot sat-
isfy the first of these desiderata, and sketched a historical theory that succeeds at
fulfilling both. However, many details remain to be filled in.
One set of questions concerns our general theory of gender categories. Our
theory of primordial genders is an idealization—we assume the existence of cate-
gories adjudicated based primarily on presumed reproductive role, but we’ve said
little about what it takes for adjudication to be based primarily on one factor rather
than another, or about what we require of ascribers’ presumptions. We have not
specified what kind of historical continuity or symbiotic dependency suffice to
bring a category into the network of genders. We claim that categories like those
identified man, woman, and genderfluid in a given real-world society, or the grrl,
boi, bloke, and sheila categories on Amazonia and Patriarcha, meet sufficient con-
ditions, but we haven’t tried to specify necessary and sufficient conditions.
Another set of questions concerns the identities of gender categories across
30
times and communities. In our Amazonia and Patriarcha cases, we stipulate a
great deal of historical continuity in order to ensure that the four gender cate-
gories remain gender categories, and that we can identify them with their histori-
cal predecessors. We also stipulate links with sex biology in order to ensure that
they count as categories of women or of men (and in particular, that ‘bloke’ and
‘sheila’ are appropriately translated as ‘woman’ and ‘man’ respectively, while
‘boi’ and ‘grrrl’ are not). There may be tricky cases concerning identity across
time, where the norms for a gender category change more drastically, where gen-
der categories split and merge over history. And there are certainly tricky cases
for identity across communities; which third-gender categories in which societies
count as categories of nonbinary people, if any?
A third set of questions concerns gender membership. What is it to belong
to a gender category G? We might equate belonging to a gender G with being
habitually gendered as a G, with being relevantly like those who are habitually
gendered as Gs, or with being someone who ought to be gendered as a G.
Our main aim has been modest: to defend the coherence of consensual gen-
dering. A theory of gender for the actual world will need to contend with the fact
that gendering is typically not consensual, that gender remains tied to reproductive
role, and that gendering practices are often used to prop up unjust social norms.
But for now, we hope to have persuaded you that a better world, where people are
sorted into gender categories based on their own wishes rather than the projections
of other people, is possible.
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